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mev-commit uses a reward and slashing system to ensure providers and validators act honestly. Both must stake tokens to participate — honest behavior is rewarded, dishonest behavior is penalized.

Validator Rewards

Validators earn more by opting in to mev-commit:
  • Higher block value — Preconfirmation bids increase the total value of blocks proposed through mev-boost. Validators passively earn this extra value just by proposing blocks from mev-commit providers.
  • Points — Opted-in validators earn points for each block proposed while opted in.
The more validators opt in, the more credible preconfirmations become, which increases their value — creating a positive feedback loop.

Validator Slashing

The risk of slashing is very low for validators acting in good faith:
  • Missed blocks — Not slashed. Network issues and chain reorgs are outside the validator’s control.
  • Self-built blocks — Not slashed. Rare edge case when relay value is too low.
  • Block from unsupported relay — Slashed 1 ETH. This indicates misconfiguration or intentional misbehavior.
An independent report by Chaos Labs confirms the risk/reward profile is favorable for validators.

Provider Rewards

Providers (block builders) earn from fulfilling commitments:
  • Fulfilled commitment — Provider receives the bid amount minus a 2% protocol fee.
  • Neutral outcome — If the provider didn’t win the block, no action is taken. No reward, no penalty.

Provider Slashing

Providers are penalized for breaking commitments they issued:
  • Broken commitment — Provider is slashed the bid’s specified slash amount, plus a 5% penalty fee. The slash amount goes to the bidder; the penalty goes to the protocol treasury.
  • Insufficient stake — If the provider can’t cover the full slash, the bidder is paid first, then the treasury receives whatever remains.
Decay is not applied to slash amounts — providers are slashed the full specified amount regardless of timing.

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