> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.primev.xyz/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# How Do Rewards and Slashing Work?

> A simplified overview of how mev-commit incentivizes honest behavior through rewards and slashing.

mev-commit uses a reward and slashing system to ensure providers and validators act honestly. Both must stake tokens to participate — honest behavior is rewarded, dishonest behavior is penalized.

## Validator Rewards

Validators earn more by opting in to mev-commit:

* **Higher block value** — Preconfirmation bids increase the total value of blocks proposed through mev-boost. Validators passively earn this extra value just by proposing blocks from mev-commit providers.
* **Points** — Opted-in validators earn [points](/v1.2.x/concepts/rewards-and-slashing/points) for each block proposed while opted in.

The more validators opt in, the more credible preconfirmations become, which increases their value — creating a positive feedback loop.

## Validator Slashing

The risk of slashing is very low for validators acting in good faith:

* **Missed blocks** — Not slashed. Network issues and chain reorgs are outside the validator's control.
* **Self-built blocks** — Not slashed. Rare edge case when relay value is too low.
* **Blocks from any builder or relay** — Not slashed. mev-commit no longer enforces a registered-provider-only block selection rule at the relay layer. Commitment accountability is enforced on the provider (builder) side; validators are not penalized for the builder their relay happened to select.

<Tip>An [independent report by Chaos Labs](https://governance.ether.fi/t/primev-symbiotic-risk-analysis/) confirms the risk/reward profile is favorable for validators.</Tip>

## Provider Rewards

Providers (block builders) earn from fulfilling commitments:

* **Fulfilled commitment** — Provider receives the bid amount minus a 2% protocol fee.
* **Neutral outcome** — If the provider didn't win the block, no action is taken. No reward, no penalty.

## Provider Slashing

Providers are penalized for breaking commitments they issued:

* **Broken commitment** — Provider is slashed the bid's specified slash amount, plus a 5% penalty fee. The slash amount goes to the bidder; the penalty goes to the protocol treasury.
* **Insufficient stake** — If the provider can't cover the full slash, the bidder is paid first, then the treasury receives whatever remains.

Decay is **not** applied to slash amounts — providers are slashed the full specified amount regardless of timing.

***

## Learn More

<CardGroup cols={2}>
  <Card title="Full Rewards & Slashing Details" icon="book-open" href="/v1.2.x/concepts/rewards-and-slashing/rewards-and-slashing">
    Complete technical documentation with diagrams.
  </Card>

  <Card title="Why Should Validators Opt In?" icon="circle-question" href="/v1.2.x/knowledge-base/why-should-validators-opt-in">
    The incentive case for validator participation.
  </Card>

  <Card title="Validator Guide" icon="shield-check" href="/v1.2.x/get-started/validators/validator-guide">
    Step-by-step opt-in instructions.
  </Card>
</CardGroup>